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SUSTAINABLY PERFORMED: RECONCILING GLOBAL VALUE
CHAIN GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMATIVITY*
ALLISON LOCONTO
M ICH IGAN ST AT E UN IVERSIT Y

ABSTRACT
Merging theories of performativity with Global Value Chains (GVC) analysis, I explore how standards
are used within GVCs to govern interactions among actors and to perform a multiplicity of ‘sustainabilities.’
Specifically, this paper presents four case studies of certified tea production in Tanzania (i.e., the Ethical Tea
Partnership, Fairtrade, Organic, and Rainforest Alliance) to reveal how visions of sustainability are enacted
by different actors in each certified value chain. This analysis reveals that, while the Rainforest Alliance and
Ethical Tea Partnership ‘sustainabilities’ are ‘generically’ performed, the Fairtrade and Organic ‘sustainabilities’
are ‘effective’ in enacting multiple versions of sustainability that have facilitated changes to practices in the tea
value chain. This attention to the enactment of values in the practice of agrifood production allows for a more
nuanced understanding of governance in value chains and suggests a way to shift discussions of GVC
governance away from the primary focus on ‘drivenness’.

In 2005, Unilever (PG Tips and Lipton) began an initiative, starting in Kenya
and Tanzania, to make its tea supply chain “sustainable” by 2015 (Unilever 2007).
Unilever is the main buyer of black tea (camellia sinensis)1 from Tanzania, it is a key
player in the global consumer market buying 12 percent of the global black tea
supply, and it is perceived to dominate the global tea trade (Bedford et al. 2002).
The company’s sustainability will be achieved by sourcing only from tea gardens
certified according to the Rainforest Alliance (RFA) standard for ‘sustainable
agriculture’, which was extended to include tea in 2007. In 2010, Tetley, Twinings,
and Taylors of Harrogate have also made similar commitments (Rainforest Alliance
2010a). However, the RFA standard is the fourth sustainability standard present in
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1

Black, green, white and oolong tea all come from the camellia sinensis plant. In this paper I use

the generic ‘tea’ to refer to black tea. Herbal infusions and rooibos are not made from the camellia
sinensis plant and therefore are not included in the discussion of tea. Reference to any other type of
tea uses an identifying adjective.
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the Tanzanian tea industry. The other three are Fairtrade,2 Organic,3 and the
Ethical Tea Partnership (ETP) and they have been certifying tea estates in
Tanzania since 1989.
This multiplicity of sustainability standards has become quite common in
several tropical commodity systems, most notably coffee and cocoa. Particularly
when talking about these tropical commodities, the distance (both geographic and
social) between consumption and production is so vast, understanding how
producers and consumers are linked in these networks is important (Lockie and
Kitto 2000). The literature suggests a need to consider the symbolic economy of
food and the complex and relational nature of power as it is extended through social
networks. This is particularly important when we are examining certified products
where these products gain their value based on social and environmental concerns.
Global Value Chains (GVC) analysis is an approach that responds to the challenges
noted above as it attempts to follow a product from point of inception to point of
consumption (Bair 2009; Friedland 1984; Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005;
Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986; Raikes, Jensen, and Ponte 2000). For example, the
tea value chain has its roots in the colonial empires of China and then Britain. As
such, en route from bush to cup, tea traverses numerous geographic and political
boundaries. As found in other value chains, this requires a significant level of
coordination and ‘governance’ of transactions (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005;
Higgins and Lawrence 2005; Ponte and Gibbon 2005).
Social and environmental standards, such as the ETP, Fairtrade, Organic, and
RFA standards, are increasingly being used by value chain actors to govern what
practices are considered sustainable in their value chains. Specifically, each written
standard codifies values of sustainability that are to govern practices in each GVC.
For example, the ETP works “to make this picture transparent – to monitor living
and working conditions on tea estates, with the aim of making sure that the tea you

2

I differentiate between Fairtrade and fair trade throughout this paper. Fairtrade refers to the

standard and organizations affiliated with the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International
(FLO), while fair trade refers to the concept and other groups not associated with FLO.
3

In this paper I also differentiate between Organic and organic. The capitalized name refers

specifically to the certified production while the lowercase word refers to the concept in general. The
organic standard that is used in the Tanzanian tea sector is the EU Regulation (EC) N° 834/2007
and (EC) N° 889/2008 (former: (EEC) N° 2092/91). The two certified estates are certified by
Ecocert and the Institute of Marketecology (IMO). However, the International Forum for Organic
Agricultural Movements (IFOAM) norm serves as the unifying vision of organic across the
national/regional organic regulations.
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buy from the members of our Partnership has been produced in a socially
responsible way”( ETP 2010a). Fairtrade focuses on “transparency, partnership and
participation, representative democracy, and equal exchange” (FLO 2010a); while
Organic agriculture is based on the principles of “health, ecology, fairness and care”
(IFOAM 2010). Finally, the RFA has created its sustainable agriculture standards
based on “economy, ecology and ethics” (Rainforest Alliance 2010b). These four
standards systems set out to distinguish themselves, rhetorically and materially,
into separate tea value chains based on their visions of sustainability.
While GVC analysis provides a useful rubric for tracing how value chain actors
relate to one another, it has not been very successful at explaining how the values
that serve as organizing concepts are involved in governing interactions.
Performativity analysis, with its attention to justifications and enactments, is
suggested as a way to address this shortcoming. Therefore, the purpose of this
paper is to examine the competitive market for sustainable tea by analyzing the
extent to which each of these four standards networks effectively governs the
notion of sustainability in their value chains. To achieve this I will explain how
standards are used within GVCs to govern interactions between human and
nonhuman actors and to perform a multiplicity of ‘sustainabilities’.
I present both theoretical and empirical evidence that will illustrate how
attention to performativity can reveal the dynamics of relational governance in
values-based commodity networks. I first explore the literature on governance in
GVCs and then link this literature with the role of standards and notions of
performativity that emerge from the Science, Technology, and Society (STS)
literature. This section has two purposes; the first is to create the conceptual
framework for the analysis, and the second is to illustrate how two bodies of
literature emerging from different epistemological standpoints can be usefully
combined to better capture notions of governance in commodity networks. This is
then illustrated through a case study of four social and environmental standards
networks working in the Tanzanian tea industry (i.e., ETP, Fairtrade, Organic, and
RFA). Data were collected between 2008 and 2010 through document analysis of
the four standards and secondary sources, semi-structured interviews (78), and
focus groups (20) with actors in the four ‘sustainable’ tea value chains that extend
from Tanzania through Kenya to Germany and the United Kingdom (UK).4

4

Formal interviews and focus groups were conducted and audio recorded with informed consent

and relevant passages were transcribed. If audio recording was not possible due to noise levels or
interviewee preference, handwritten notes were recorded.
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Analysis of these data illustrates how performances of sustainability are exemplary
of the networks in which they are embedded. For example, the RFA value chain is
a buyer-driven, hierarchically-governed value chain and thus the vision of
sustainability is also performed according to the vision of the lead buyer in that
chain. I conclude this paper with reflections on how performances of sustainability
interact with performances of GVC governance, suggesting that those networks
that are better able to articulate and interpret their visions of sustainability will be
better able to govern processes up, down, and across value chain networks.
GOVERNANCE OF GVCS
The purpose of this section is to provide an understanding of how governing
power is articulated in a network of actors, as this has remained an important
analytical question in GVC research. The dimensions of power relations in GVCs,
as put forth originally by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994), consist of: their inputoutput structure, their geographical coverage, their form of governance, and their
institutional framework. The notion of governance structure highlighted the issues
of barriers to entry and chain coordination that are found in the practice of
governing GVCs, and thus brought these concerns into the rubric of analysis
(Raikes, Jensen, and Ponte 2000). Governance has been described as a networkbased system of regulation, which ideally functions through processes of exchange
and negotiation (Carnoy and Castells 2001). As such, the GVC approach analyses
the role of leading firms in shaping globally-integrated production chains that
incorporate a network of sourcing firms and places focus on power relations
embedded in the chains. Gereffi et al. (2005) generated five types of global value
chain governance – hierarchy, captive, relational, modular, and market – which
range from high to low levels of power asymmetry among value chain actors.
There is thus an aspect of ‘drivenness’ to chain coordination where typically a
lead firm drives decisions and governs the interactions of participants in the chain.
Much of the literature has been dedicated to describing producer-driven or buyerdriven value chains (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; 2005; Raikes, Jensen, and Ponte
2000). In fact, many value chains in the current agrifood system have been buyerdriven with high barriers to entry and high profits near the consumption end of the
chain; characterized by the protection and promotion of brands by intermediate
buyers such as processors, supermarket labeled products, and retailers (Conroy
2007; Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Fold and Larsen 2008; Konefal et al. 2007;
Raikes, Jensen, and Ponte 2000).
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However, Gibbon and Ponte (2005) have argued that governance cannot be
written off merely as coordination of actors, as there are numerous nodes along the
chain where negotiation must occur to effectively coordinate actors. Therefore,
governance exists when certain actors exhibit different types of power during these
negotiations. This can be interpreted not only as the manifestation of direct power
of a lead firm over other actors in the chain, but rather as an actor’s ‘discursive
power’ within chain negotiations (Tallontire et al. 2009). In other words, those
stakeholders who are not necessarily party to the exchange may govern value
chains and the standards used by them (e.g., Fairtrade and Organic value chains).
Therefore, value chain governance must also consider how the typical aspects of
power combine with the “broader narratives about quality circulating within society
more generally” (Ponte and Gibbon 2005:3). This has been discussed as a form of
cultural or symbolic power in value chains based on embedded and complex social
relations (Dixon 1999; Freidberg 2004; Lockie and Kitto 2000).
As such, governing power within value chains can extend vertically (with
respect to the relations along the value chain) and horizontally (with respect to
stakeholders in the supplier country) among value chain actors and third-party
actors who are not necessarily party to the economic transactions in the value
chains but are involved in adding ‘values’ to the products and processes (Tallontire
et al. 2009). Put differently, we can see “twin-driven commodity chains” (TDCC)
where lead firms govern the supply network, while environmental
groups/movements and third-party certifiers/standards developers govern the
regulatory aspects of the network, “sometimes both working in an overlapping
manner” (Islam 2008:217). Thus, as Foucault (1977) observed, “power is exercised
from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations”
(p. 94). In other words, the lens of governmentality may be a more meaningful rubric
through which to examine the governance of actors in GVCs (cf. Gibbon and Ponte
2008), as it covers a range of practices that “constitute, define, organize, and
instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use in dealing
with each other” (Foucault 1997: 300). This allows us to see power as the “outcome
of collective actions exercised through networks of associations” (Cheshire and
Lawrence 2005:36). Therefore, it is important to understand how these strategies
take shape in GVCs. A common strategy adopted by both buyers and producers is
that of utilizing standards, and their systems of conformity assessment, as ways of
organizing and governing the processes of production.
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STANDARDS AS DEVICES FOR ENACTING GOVERNANCE
Increasingly important in the coordination and differentiation of GVCs is the
use of standards and specifically certified production and its accompanying
consumer labels to add value to agrifood products (Hatanaka and Busch 2008).
More specifically, ethically-certified products have become popular with consumers
who identify with the value claims they represent. As they are utilized in GVCs,
standards act as “rules about what those who adopt them should do” (Brunsson and
Jacobsson 2000:4). Yet most standards used in GVCs are not formal laws or
regulations. Standards act more like conventions that “determine the content and
the form of the production and circulation of commodities” (Wilkinson 1997:317).
They can be either “sets of standardized, codified rules and norms that impose
conventions across a range of diverse contexts,” or they “may emerge from local,
personalized, idiosyncratic sets of relations” (Murdoch and Miele 1999:471). As
such, conventions serve as both guides for action and collective systems that
legitimize these actions through norms and values, standards of uniformity, and
rules and institutions to apply and enforce those standards (Gibbon and Ponte 2005;
Ponte and Gibbon 2005).
Increasingly, standards can be viewed as socio-technical mechanisms to classify
and establish social and moral order within GVCs (Bowker and Star 1999; Busch
2000a, 2000b). Standards then become “the measures by which products, processes,
and producers are judged” (Busch and Bingen 2006:3). In other words, they are
socio-technical devices (i.e., outcomes of interactions stabilized and codified) that are
reused to ‘objectively’ govern the actions of people and things (Busch and Tanaka
1996; Law 1991). Thus, within the context of GVCs, standards are used
strategically by value chain actors to judge and discipline the relations among
actors. However, the language of ‘drivenness’ still does not fully capture how these
actors who are not part of the value chain are able or unable to integrate their
vision of sustainability with that of the value chain actors. To do this we must look
at the enactment of standards in GVCs.
PERFORMING VALUES BY ENACTING STANDARDS
The notion of performativity has its forerunners in the theories of Mead ([1934]
1962), Schutz ([1932] 1967), Goffman (1974) and Hilgartner (2000), but the use of
this notion in the STS literature does not adopt the dramaturgical perspective
wherein there is some version of ‘self’ hiding behind the performance. Hacking
(1983) suggested that ‘scientific’ representations of the world can only be
comprehended by also paying attention to the interventions inspired by, or are
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concurrent with, the representations. In other words, the ‘performative idiom’
(Pickering 1995) is more attentive to activity than to knowledge alone. Thus, the
notion of performativity suggests that “realities (including objects and subjects) and
representations of those realities are being enacted or performed simultaneously”
(Law 2008:635).
Recent research on performativity suggests that abstract or ‘virtual’
representations shape reality (Callon 1998; MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007;
Muniesa 2007). That is, performativity analysis studies how imaginaries, or virtues,
are brought to life in empirical reality through actions and discourse (Law 2008).
It thus suggests that materiality, locality, and empirical story are entangled in the
enactment of values and virtues (cf. Haraway 2001; Law and Urry 2004). As Law
(2004) explained, “enactment is the continuing practice of crafting. Enactment and
practice never stop, and realties depend upon their continued crafting ( . . . ) in a
combination of people, techniques, texts, architectural arrangements, and natural
phenomena” (p. 56). Using certifications as an example of how standards are
enacted, these representations are ‘virtual’ in that their value is not contained purely
in their material substance (e.g., paper certificates, labels), but in the claims on
future states of the world that they embody and the governance mechanism needed
to verify that claim (i.e., organic certification). Thus the interactions that constitute
performances include both those who are performing and those who are evaluating
the performances (Boltanski and Thévenot [1991] 2006).
As standards are linked to physical objects (e.g., scientific tests, paper
certifications), the abstract nature of these values is rendered concrete.
Performativity analysis looks specifically at the strategies by which compliance with
standards is disciplined and contained, and the tactics deployed by those engaged
in GVCs to negotiate this discipline (cf. Bell 2007; Busch 2000a; Butler 1990). It is
also used to understand what is being valued through practices, such as audits and
market contracts, and how these values play out in the process itself (Power 1997).
Thus, the multiple performances that we observe in the coordination of GVCs are
the actualization of these values in the empirical world - a process of differentiation.
For example, we can note the enactment of quality conventions (e.g., Barrientos and
Dolan 2006; Callon, Méadel, and Rabeharisoa 2002; Morgan, Marsden, and
Murdoch 2006; Murdoch, Marsden, and Banks 2000; Ponte and Gibbon 2005),
barriers to entry (e.g., Daviron and Ponte 2005; Gibbon and Ponte 2005;
Giovannucci and Ponte 2005; Henson and Reardon 2005; Trienekens and Zuurbier
2008), supply chain management (e.g., Burch and Lawrence 2007; Busch 2007;
Konefal et al. 2007; Ponte 2009; Weatherspoon and Reardon 2003), corporate social

Published by eGrove, 2010

7

Journal of Rural Social Sciences, Vol. 25 [2010], Iss. 3, Art. 10

200

JOURNAL OF RURAL SOCIAL SCIENCES

responsibility (CSR) (e.g., Jenkins 2001; Maloni and Brown 2006; Reardon et al.
2001), and regulation (Hatanaka, Bain, and Busch 2005; Loconto and Busch 2010;
Ponte 2007).
However, not all performances are ‘effective.’ Effective performances are
distinguished from ‘generic’ performances by the actors’ abilities to make a
difference in practice through the abstract representation of a value (MacKenzie
2007). Ponte (2007) illustrated this distinction with a case study from Uganda. In
the late 1990s, the European Union (EU) imposed repeated bans on fish imported
from Uganda based on the poor performance of Uganda’s regulatory and
monitoring system. “Only by fixing ‘the system’ (of regulations and inspections) and
performing the ritual of laboratory testing for all consignments for export to the
EU did the Ugandan industry regain its status as a ‘safe’ source of fish” (Ponte
2007:180). Therefore, Ponte (2007) claimed that it was the ‘ritual of verification’ (cf.
Power 1997) that the regulatory structure performed, rather than an effective
change in the practices of fish production systems that rendered the fish ‘safe’ for
consumption. In this sense the performance of food safety regulation was generic
because it did not enact changes in the material practices. Thus we can summarize
the theoretical project of this paper, which is to show how the concept of
‘sustainability’ is performed in the empirical world, how it shapes and is shaped by
the actors and standards involved, and how it is maintained through the
interactions involved in producing ‘sustainable’ tea. These performances can be
judged as effective or generic based on the resonance of similar justifications by
various actors up, down, and outside the value chain. In other words, are all actors
performing a story of sustainability that holds together or are we actually observing
multiple ‘sustainabilities’?
PERFORMING THE TANZANIAN TEA VALUE CHAIN
First introduced in 1903, tea is a priority crop for Tanzania and the fifth largest
export crop after cotton, coffee, cashew nut, and tobacco. The local rural economy
benefits by about $15 million annually. The industry also provides rural social
facilities such as dispensaries, day care centers, schools, and hospitals as well as
local goods and services (Ndunguru 2001). The tea industry has been providing
such facilities since tea was first grown as a commercial plantation crop by Brooke
Bond in the 1920s (Mbilinyi 1986). The tea sector in Tanzania is fully privatized
(Tea Act 1997), and while the land area is divided evenly between large estates (>
200 hectares) and outgrowers (medium scale averaging 16 hectares and
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smallholders averaging 0.37 hectares), outgrowers contribute less than 30 percent
of total tea production (Simbua and Loconto 2010).
Tea production is labor intensive. It has a year-round harvest where the leaves
must be plucked from the bushes at intervals ranging from 7 to 20 days depending
on the season. Processing must also occur immediately as delaying more than 12
hrs from the time the green leaves are plucked to when they arrive at the processing
factory will result in substandard tea. This translates into very restricted catchment
areas around factories where both estate-grown and smallholder-grown tea is found
(Simbua 2006). This ties factories and farmers together in close geographic
proximity with little option for competitive markets for green leaf. As a result,
contract farming schemes, which link smallholders to processing factories, have
long been used. In this system, small-scale farmers have access to inputs,
agricultural technology, and markets through contracts that require them to
produce according to international market requirements (FAO 2009). All factories
in Tanzania use the cut-tear-curl (CTC) method of tea processing for teas that will
be sold in tea bags. However, two of the Fairtrade and Organic certified factories
are also producing orthodox tea, which means that the tea leaves are rolled rather
than cut before the oxidization process that produces black tea. In total, tea
production consists of nineteen factories owned by nine companies (three factories
are jointly owned by smallholder associations). Eighteen of the nineteen processing
factories in Tanzania are known as estate factories, as the company that owns the
factory sources most of its leaf from its own estates. There is only one factory, in
the Usambara region of Tanzania that sources all of its leaf from smallholder farms.
Traditional tea production falls into the category of buyer-driven commodity
chains as buyers dictate prices, quality, and other aspects of governance. However,
Simbua (2006) considers the tea-processing factory to be “the anchor of the tea
value chain: a stage where the core competence of the entire tea value chain resides”
(p. 189). It is a high investment stage where the costs raise the barrier to entry in
the chain. Most of the activities upstream (green leaf production) as well as
downstream (marketing and sales) are usually controlled by the decisions made at
the tea-processing factory (Simbua 2006). Thus, the key certification decision lies
at the factory level as it is here that farmers must necessarily sell their green leaf,
due to geographic, contractual, and infrastructural constraints.
Market prices are fixed at the Mombasa Auction (Kenya) and certification
premiums are based on these prices (Baffes 2003). Tea quality plays a vital role in
determining the final value at the auction. Although market forces may affect the
general price levels, it is ‘quality’ (based on organoleptic characteristics) which
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distinguishes the value of tea across different factories irrespective of demand and
supply patterns in the marketplace (Simbua 2006). Most sales of certified tea are
conducted through private contracts and do not enter the auction system.5 Private
contracts of non-certified tea also avoid passing through the Mombasa Auction;
however, as a measure of good practice, factories usually sell a “minimum of 30
percent of their tea via the auction” so that they can be assured of the market value
of their tea (Interview June, 2008). The use of private, direct-sale contracts has been
a common practice in the Tanzanian tea industry for many European markets as
well as for the domestic market (TBT 2009). These relationships have been built
up over the decades and are deeply embedded in the supply networks that bring tea
from Tanzania to the UK and Germany, which are the main destinations for
Tanzanian certified tea.
PERFORMING SUSTAINABILITY
As noted in the introduction, four sustainability standards have been in practice
in the Tanzanian tea industry since 1994 (RFA, ETP, Fairtrade, and Organic).
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of each sustainability standard as they were
described by various value chain actors in this study. This section presents the
characteristics of each of those standards and analyses their enactments of
sustainability in turn. The cases show an equal split between generic and effective
performativity of the values of sustainability. In other words, the utilization of these
standards by some value chain actors is enacting change in their practices, but not
in all four value chains.
Rainforest Alliance
The RFA-certified seal is awarded to farms that have met the environmental,
social, and economic standards of the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN), a
coalition of local conservation organizations in Latin America that first set the
standard for sustainable farming in rainforest areas in the early 1990s (Willie,
Aerts, and Geier 2010). The SAN standards cover ecosystem conservation, worker

5

As of 2010 a very small amount of FLO-certified and RFA-certified tea were passing through

the auction system. However, the use of the auction system is expected to increase as those blenders
who have adopted the RFA standard rely upon the auction system and the supply of RFA-certified
tea is expected to increase. FLO has also reintroduced its retro-certification process for tea in the
2010 revision of their tea standard; therefore the reliance on the auction system is also expected to
increase for FLO-certified tea.
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TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF THE FOUR SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS.

STANDARD
Ethical Tea
Partnership

Fairtrade
(FLO)

Published by eGrove, 2010

EST .
TEA
1997

SUSTAINABILITY
TYPE
CRITERIA
Estate
Good social and
Factory environmental
(14)
conditions that
improve the lives of
tea workers

1994

Estate
Factory
(4)
Smallholders
(1)

ILLUSTRATIVE
COMPLIANCE
INVESTMENTS
Field toilets & hand
washing facilities
Provision of health
and safety training
Protective gear

CERT .
COSTS
N/A

Transparency,
$4,000
partnership and
participation,
representative
democracy, and equal
exchange
No GMOs

Someone who can
create budgets,
policies,
management plans,
environmental
plans, & meeting
minutes
Trainings held on
environmental
plan, FT general
awareness
Risk assessments of
soil erosion, health
& safety

11

BENEFITS
CSR program for
UK blenders
Future access to
assistance in
gaining RFA and
FLO certification
$1.60/kg floor
price (2010)
Fairtrade premium
($0.50/kg)
Community
Infrastructural
Investments
Direct sales
Management
system

CHALLENGES
No market benefit
Audits have been
difficult in the past

Low overall market
demand
Constraints on use
of funds from the
premium
Use of the Auction
system
Paper trails

Journal of Rural Social Sciences, Vol. 25 [2010], Iss. 3, Art. 10

Organic
(EU
Regulation,
Ecocert,
IMO,
IFOAM)

1988

Estate
Holistic notion of
Factory agriculture based on
(2)
the values of fairness,
ecology, hope and
care
Low reliance on
agrochemicals
No GMOs

$5,000

Rainforest
Alliance
(SAN)

2008

Estate
Economy, Ecology
Factory and Ethics
(2)
Waste management
No GMOs

$5,000

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol25/iss3/10

Separation of
organic and
conventional tea on
farm, in transport,
in factory
Purchase of
composting
materials
Additional labor for
manual weeding
Soil Analysis
Water Analysis
Tree barriers
between fields
Waste
Management
strategy
Conversion of nontea crops on
smallholder farms
to RFA compliant
crops

12

Strong policy level
and donor support
Organic price
premium
Direct sales
RFA and FLO
recognize Organic
in their standards

Low overall market
demand
Paper trails
High input costs
(labor &
composting)
Lack of research on
organic tea

Access to Lipton,
Tetley, Twinings,
Betty & Taylors of
Harrogate markets
$0.10/kg premium
from Lipton
Environmental
benefits
Management
system

Support needed to
prepare
smallholders for
certification
Price premium is
temporary (phased
out in 2010)
RFA new to the
industry
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rights and safety, wildlife protection, water and soil conservation, agrochemical
reduction, and education for farm children. In this way the Rainforest Alliance
strives to foster the values of ‘economy, ecology and ethics’ in its certified value
chains (Rainforest Alliance 2010b).
Since 2008, the RFA has had one broad agricultural standard for more than 100
crops. Tea-specific criteria were established in 2007 following an audit of the
Unilever tea estates in Kericho (Rainforest Alliance 2007). The original audit of tea
plantations in Tanzania was conducted in 2008 by the SAN certifiers; subsequent
inspections will be done by Africert (a Kenyan agribusiness certifying agency that
also certifies against GLOBALGAP, ETP, BRC and Utz Kapeh) or the Institute of
Marketecology (IMO, which also conducts organic audits). In Tanzania, to date, the
RFA standard has only been adopted by Unilever (on its own estates and in two of
its three factories).6
Unilever factories in Tanzania source mostly from medium scale growers and
95 percent of green leaf comes from their own plantations. Unilever operates a
vertically-integrated value chain where it owns green leaf production, processing
factories, and blending and packing facilities. Green leaf that is not bought by
Lipton (Unilever’s blending company) goes into the traditional market through
Mombasa and into non-certified tea (despite being produced according to RFA
standards). While most tea is bought directly from factories due to the
commitments made and the scarcity of certified tea, there is also no mechanism
within the RFA standard to prevent the use of the auction system. In fact, the aim
is to “continue to rely upon the auction system” for tea trading (Interview
December, 2009).
To date, the cost of certification has been borne by Unilever. However, there is
no clear articulation of how the outgrowers in Tanzania will become certified. The
RFA has been looking to donors for funds that can be used to provide the training
and technical assistance needed for helping small farmers to meet the certification
requirements (Interview June, 2009). To encourage other brands and producers to
join the Rainforest Alliance system, Lipton was offering a $0.10/kg premium
phased out in 2010. This has helped to create more interest in the system and other
large tea blenders (notably Tetley and Twinings) have committed to joining the
system. However, the ‘demand-driven’ approach to certification that the RFA uses
translates on the ground into many producers who are interested in becoming

6

As of 2010, two additional companies were in discussion with the RFA to try to negotiate their

involvement in the system.
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certified, yet to date have not been able to because of a lack of RFA presence in the
region and their policy of first certifying those producers who have an existing
demand for their tea (i.e., Lipton, Tetley and, Twinings’ preferred producers).
Generic performance. The ‘economy, ecology and ethics’ focus of the RFA
standard fits hand in glove with Unilever’s ‘people, planet, profit’ focus of
sustainable agriculture that has been an internal company standard since the late
1990s. The RFA claims that “the tea industry has faced many challenges, from
declining prices to poor farming and environmentally damaging practices. The
Rainforest Alliance certification program assists farmers in addressing these issues
and in reaching new value-added markets as well as focusing on improving
productivity and significantly improving their quality of life ” (Rainforest Alliance
2010a). Therefore, by focusing on economy, the RFA standard promises to bring
improved efficiency, more competitive production, premium prices, access to credit
based on an RFA guarantee, and generally improved profitability and
competitiveness for farmers. In terms of ecology, the RFA standard focuses on
limiting soil erosion, reducing water consumption, protecting wildlife habitats,
increasing the efficiency of farm management and waste management, and
controlling the use of agrochemicals. In terms of ethics, the RFA standard lays out
what is required to improve conditions for farm workers, provide for health and
human safety, and promote collaboration between farmers & conservationists
(Rainforest Alliance 2009).
The adoption of the RFA standard is clearly perceived by Unilever as a supply
chain strategy that draws upon its CSR image of a ‘sustainable’ company. For
example, Unilever (2007) claims that this initiative:
has the potential to reassure consumers about the source of the tea they
enjoy drinking so much; to improve the crops, incomes and livelihoods of
nearly 1 million people in Africa and, eventually, up to 2 million people
around the world; to protect the environment from a further drain on its
resource and to provide us with a means by which we can differentiate our
brands from those of our competitors (Unilever 2007).
Thus, we could characterize Unilever’s GVC as buyer-driven, which is exhibited in
its ability to enroll the RFA standard as part of its supply chain management
strategy. In effect, Unilever “outsourced” its internal sustainable agriculture
program to the RFA; “one of the reasons was the high overlap with the internal
system” (Interview June, 2010).
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This claim is reinforced by the results of the first audit where the Kenyan
estates passed with nearly 100 percent compliance and the Tanzanian estates with
about 80 percent compliance. The process was described this way:
It was very easy for us to become certified when RFA came in. Unilever was
looking for a partnership for them to say that they were sustainable. We did
very little to get certified. (Interview November, 2009)
Overall, the addition of the RFA standard to Unilever’s GVC has changed very
little, to date, in the enactment of sustainability. The Unilever managers at the
estate in Tanzania showed me that one of the few changes that were required of
them was to cut down a eucalyptus grove that was planted too close to a body of
water and replace it with a mix of less water hungry trees and some local species
(Interview February, 2010).7
Moreover, the high overlap of Unilever’s internal standard and their decision
to bring the RFA into the tea sector by their public commitment in 2007 suggest
that Unilever has played a large role in determining what sustainable tea
production looks like in practice. Thus, the RFA largely functions to legitimate
Unilever’s practices as sustainable. One manager explained it like this:
The Rainforest Alliance changed not very much about the way that UTEA
[Unilever Tea East Africa] operates, except strategy – now we are
producing Rainforest Alliance certified tea, rather than just producing tea
according to the principles of sustainable agriculture. (Interview November,
2009)
Therefore the enactment of sustainability that is observed throughout the current
RFA value chain is effectively the Unilever version. Thus, the RFA efforts to make
the Unilever performances into their own are generic at best. However, given the
short amount of time that the RFA has been involved in the sector, this is expected.
What happens over the next ten years as the RFA establishes itself as a powerful
actor in the value chain will most likely result in different performances of
sustainability.

7

This grove was still standing a year after the original audit, as management was waiting for

the trees to fully mature so that they could harvest them for firewood, as was the original purpose
of the grove.
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The Ethical Tea Partnership (ETP)
The ETP began in 1997 as the Tea Sourcing Partnership when “a number of
large tea companies made the ground-breaking decision to work together to
promote sustainability in the sector, rather than competing on ethics” (ETP 2010b:
1). It currently consists of 20 international tea packers who sell tea in Europe,
North America, Australia, and New Zealand. The most notable are Tetley,
Twinings, The Republic of Tea, TAZO, Taylors of Harrogate, and Sara Lee.8
Founding members Unilever and James Finlay have pulled out of the partnership
since 2007 in favor of the RFA and Fairtrade standards (James Finlay has adopted
both).
The ETP developed its tea-specific standard from the Ethical Trade Initiative
base standard (Blowfield 2004). The ETP looks at five areas: employment
(including minimum age and wage levels), education, maternity, health and safety,
and housing and basic rights. It also added an environmental component in the
2009 version of the standard (ETP 2010a). The purpose of the ETP standard is “to
make this picture transparent – to monitor living and working conditions on tea
estates, with the aim of making sure that the tea you buy from the members of our
Partnership has been produced in a socially responsible way” (ETP 2010a). In the
past, this has been done by ‘monitoring’ producers. As such, the UK-based tea
blenders/packers are members of the ETP and ‘monitoring’ (or certification audits)
of the producing estates and factories is paid for by the members. Producers are
approached by ETP monitors through the buyers to which they sell their tea.
Producers begin with a self-assessment questionnaire about their practices.
Nonconformances are then identified and monitored by the ETP every three years.
Of the 19 tea processing factories in Tanzania, 13 with estates and one
supported solely by smallholder tea were exporting their tea for the international
market during the period of data collection. All of these exporting factories in
Tanzania have been certified by the ETP at some point over the past ten years,
many remembering that the last audit occurred in 2007. In theory, factories should
lose certification if they exceed the maximum level of nonconformances, but in
practice this is not often the case (Interview July, 2008). Put differently, the ETP
members continue to rely on the traditional value chain to purchase tea from the
same producers that they usually do, despite the results of ETP’s monitoring
efforts.

8

Sara Lee is actually one of the largest blenders supplying the Dutch market. It controlled 65

percent of the Dutch consumer market in 2008. See: (van der W al 2008)
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Generic performance. The original ‘monitoring’ was completed by Price
Waterhouse Coopers (a financial auditing firm), first sending auditors from London
and subsequently from Nairobi. However, both the ETP and producers reported
numerous problems with the audit process and the 2009 revised standard was also
accompanied by a new auditor – AfriCert Ltd., noted above as the new inspector for
the RFA audits. Recent developments show the ETP moving into a “capacity
building” role within the tea sector (ETP 2009). Within this role, the ETP plans to
assist producers in becoming certified according to RFA and UTZ certifications.9
The ETP also accepts the Fairtrade standard as evidence of compliance with the
ETP standard, but as of 2010 there was no formal agreement. The focus is thus
shifting from monitoring noncompliances to identifying core issues in the industry
and working with producers to eliminate them. While the ETP has no clear
presence in Tanzania, the organization claims to be working hard in Kenya to
reduce child labor and sexual harassment in the tea sector (ETP 2010b).
This initiative is wholly driven and governed by the UK-based tea blenders. The
Dutch Tea Initiative10, a nongovernmental watchdog organization, has expressed
concern about all of these efforts. For example, in a 2006 report they found that the
ETP’s code was unclear as to the standards to which the members were actually
committing themselves, and little to no reference was made to environmental
standards (SOMO, ProFound, and India Committee of the Netherlands 2006).
Moreover, the Tanzanian producers called the ETP standard a ‘CSR exercise’ and
they recalled the rather difficult audits that were conducted by Price Waterhouse
Coopers, who followed the standard to the letter and were not familiar enough with
the tea industry to be able to interpret the standard (Interview October, 2009). A
particular point of contention was the latrine requirement. It was explained as
follows:
Say in the farm, for instance when you are working with the tea farms, the
standard requires every farm there should be a latrine and there should be
a washing facility aside. You see all these require a lot of investment, so

9

In 2008, UTZ Kapeh launched a standard for tea, but by 2010 this was still not being used in

Tanzania and therefore was not included in this study.
10

The ‘Dutch Tea Initiative’ is an alliance of Dutch non-governmental organizations, including

development organizations and trade unions, working for the improvement of labor, social,
ecological, and economic conditions in the tea sector in tea-producing countries.
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most of the operators would fail some of these – because of money.
(Interview February, 2010)
The sticking point here is that the standard requires such facilities in each field, but
the estate manager explained that due to the plucking rotations, workers went to
each field only once or twice a month. In sum, the ETP standard was enacted as a
controversy over toilets.
These weaknesses in the ETP standard reduced it to a tick-box exercise, as one
of my research participants explained: “you can only get a tick in the box. And if
you get a tick in the box, you get a tick in the box. And you can do twice as well and
you can still only get one tick (…) you've only got to do well enough to pass that
criteria” (Interview June, 2010). This results in a highly captive, buyer-driven GVC
as the ability to frame sustainability is being implemented by downstream actors.
Thus, the notion of sustainability that is performed in this GVC is wholly driven by
the ETP and their members, with little input or participation by producers. Recent
developments show the ETP moving into a “capacity building” role within the tea
sector (ETP 2009). As one ETP employee put it: “ETP has 80-90 percent of the
same criteria as the others. Now the focus is on getting those producers who are not
otherwise certified. ETP doesn’t replicate” (Interview August, 2009). Within this
role, the ETP plans to assist producers in becoming certified against Rainforest
Alliance and UTZ certifications. In other words, the ineffective or “generic
performativity” of the ETP vision of sustainability has eroded its ability to sustain
engagement with stakeholders aligned around this common interpretation of
sustainability, thus forcing them to collaborate with other standards systems in
order to stay in business.
Fairtrade and Organic11
Fairtrade. The Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO) standards
and certification system was officially established in 1997 to bring together the
already existing fair trade marks in Europe and North America. The FLO standard
is based on the ideas of “transparency, partnership and participation, representative
democracy, and equal exchange” (FLO 2010a). Within the Fairtrade system traders
and producers must be certified in the tea value chain. This translates into
certification for producers (farms and factories), buyers (international traders), and
blenders/packers. Both estate-sourced and smallholder-sourced factories can

11

In Tanzania, the Organic value chain is cross-certified with the Fairtrade value chain.
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become certified for tea according to the Hired Labor (HL) standard, while the
Small Producer Organization (SPO) standard governs the certification of the
smallholder tea growers associations.12 Fair trade certification in Tanzania began
in 1994 with two of the three Mufindi Tea Company (MTC) factories being the first
to receive fair trade certification through Tradecraft – “because [they] believed in
the ethics that fair trade represented” (Interview October, 2009). There are
currently five factories certified against the FLO standards and Fairtrade-certified
sales account for an average of 8 percent of total sales. Four of these have estates
that are certified via the HL mechanism, while the fifth sources from a certified
SPO. The certified SPO, Rungwe Smallholder Tea Growers Association (RSTGA),
also owns 25 percent of shares in the Wakulima Tea Company (WATCO), which
is the company that owns the processing factory.
Fairtrade-certified tea accounted for 7 percent of UK’s tea sales in 2009, with
the top three retailers being Tesco (market share 31 percent), Asda (17 percent),
and Sainsbury (16 percent) (van Reenen, Panhuysen, and Weiligmann 2010).
Supermarkets’ own brand teas are expected to increase the percentage of Fairtrade
certified tea in 2010. For example, Sainsbury has committed to purchasing 6000
tons of Fairtrade tea for its own brand tea, while the Co-op and Marks & Spencer
have promised to move toward sourcing 100 percent of their own brand teas from
Fairtrade certified tea producers (van Reenen, Panhuysen, and Weiligmann
2010:14). Fairtrade has also indicated the interest of large supermarket brands in
their 2010 tea revision document wherein they propose to producers a tradeoff of
lower premium funds for higher volumes of sales in order to attract the business of
larger buyers (FLO 2010b). However, this reduction in the premium was not
approved by the producers and therefore there is “no change in Premium [sic] for
now” (FLO 2010c).
FLO certification also allows for the continued use of the traditional value chain
via their provision for retroactive certification, which involves a buyer that has
bought product from a certified producer or conveyor under ordinary conditions
(noncertified), and wants to convert it into a certified product (FLO 2010c). Thus
many of the large multinationals and UK supermarkets continue to rely on the
auction system for purchasing their tea through the usual channels (cf. Dolan 2008).
However, we do see a number of deviations from this model in the Tanzanian case.
Most notable are the cases of Cafédirect and the German market where there is a

12

The Fairtrade Tea standard and statistics cover black, green, white, and oolong tea; they also

include herbal infusions (i.e., camomile, hibiscus, mint), spices, and rooibos tea.
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long history of direct sourcing and embedded relationships with Tanzanian
producers. For example, two factories (owned by MTC and WATCO) are also
shareholders in Cafédirect and are involved in a number of additional ‘development’
projects in collaboration with Cafédirect. We also see a large number of
nongovernmental and governmental organizations involved in providing policy and
capacity building support to the Fairtrade system.
Organic. The organic agriculture system is based on the principles of “health,
ecology, fairness and care” (IFOAM 2010). It is a holistic certification system that
has been incorporated into law in many countries around the world. Particularly
important for Tanzanian tea are the EU Regulations (EC) N° 834/2007 and (EC)
N° 889/2008 (former: (EEC) N° 2092/91). However, the International Forum for
Organic Agricultural Movements (IFOAM) norm serves as the unifying vision of
organic across the national/regional organic regulations. The Organic certification
is also the only certification that covers all stages of the value chain, which is
fundamental to its principle of traceability.
Since 1989/90, the Herkulu Estate, owned by Bombay Burmah Trading
Corporation Ltd., has been organically cultivated; beginning in 1994 it was certified
organic by the Institute of Marketecology (IMO) (Bombay Burmah 2010). Luponde
(owned by MTC) received organic certification in 1988 from the Soil Association
(Interview November 2009). Luponde is currently certified organic through
Ecocert, Madagascar. Decisions to use a specific certification body are made by
factory management based on the instructions given by their international buyers
who inform them of the certifier that must be used.
Organic tea is currently only bought through direct contracts. It accounted for
an average of 25 percent of total sales in 2009. A price premium is paid for organic
tea, which is difficult to determine because most certified organic tea that is
exported from Tanzania is actually of the orthodox method rather than CTC. This
also adds an additional price premium. “Germany is the largest organic food market
in Europe and labeled Organic tea accounts for about 4 percent of the German tea
market” (van Reenen, Panhuysen, and Weiligmann 2010:14). Also, as mentioned
above, 77 percent of the Fairtrade-certified teas are cross-certified with Organic. In
addition, the largest organic and Fairtrade specialty blender in Germany, Cha Dô,
supplies blended teas to the UK and North American markets as does Kirchner,
Fischer, & Co GmbH. Cha Dô is also an agent of the company that markets
Herkulu’s tea. In addition to purchasing under both the Organic and Fairtrade
labels, Cha Dô provides technical assistance on tea quality (Interview March, 2010).
Kirchner, Fischer, & Co GmbH (K, F & Co.) owns the Mt. Everest Tea Company,
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which is one of the oldest specialty tea companies in Germany. Specializing in
orthodox blends, K, F & Co. only began purchasing Luponde teas in 2010. They
first learned of it by tasting a sample that was sent to them from the UK-based
wholesaler Thompson, Lloyd, & Ewert, which has a long-standing relationship of
buying teas directly from MTC and WATCO (Interview May, 2010).
Organic orthodox teas from Luponde also have a direct route to retail in the UK
market. Luponde Tea is a shop in the Burlington Arcade in London, which
exclusively sells tea from the Luponde estates. While this retail company is separate
from the Luponde estates, they share a common investor, which has facilitated the
direct trade route from farm to shop. There is also a domestic value chain for
organic tea. Chai TTB and Chai Bora, the two leading tea packers in the Tanzanian
market, both offer organic brands for the local market. These include black tea,
green tea, mint, chamomile, lemon verbena and hibiscus infusions, which come
mostly from Luponde. These are sold in the main supermarkets in the large urban
centers in the country, in the airport shops, and in the tourist areas.
Cross-certified sustainability. Fairtrade’s notion of sustainability, as articulated by
FLO International, focuses on wages, living situation, and working conditions of
its pickers and promotes direct purchase of tea from the estate or cooperative
factory. The price paid for Tanzanian Fairtrade-certified tea should cover the
production costs and not be lower than the FLO floor price of $1.50/kg in addition
to a premium of $0.50/ kg. This Fairtrade premium goes to a community fund
which is used according to the interests of the community, such as for building
classrooms and health clinics, and bringing electricity to the villages. Producers are
evaluated according to specific social, economic, and environmental development
indicators and must pay about $5,000 for the yearly audit. With tea plantations, the
focus of the fair trade movement was predominantly focused on eliminating child
labor and improving the working conditions of hired labor. In practice, this entailed
“devising a contract with the plantation owners to ensure benefits were given to
workers, good labor practices were being maintained, and the extra benefits were
helping social development objectives” (Auld 2009: 341). To this end, a
‘sustainability margin’ was added to the Fairtrade tea premium to encourage estate
factories to participate in the system. The ‘sustainability margin’ is a payment of
$0.10/Kg out of the $0.50/Kg that goes to the estate management to support
improvements in working conditions as part of ongoing certification and
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compliance with Fairtrade standards13 (FLO 2010b). Thus, much of the enactment
of the Fairtrade standard concerns the premium funds and how these funds are
used. Put differently, there is a distinct enactment of ‘community projects,’ whereby
local politics are often involved in determining how these funds are used, as a means
to justify sustainability.
Organic agriculture’s notion of sustainability is ecological; it focuses on
production and limited use of agrochemicals, and requires a three-year transition
from traditional to organic farming. Organic premiums are market premiums paid
directly to the producers. Like Fairtrade, Organic producers pay a similar price for
certification. In both cases, numerous NGOs are involved in assisting small-farmer
certification. Fairtrade and Organic tea are almost exclusively cross-certified in
Tanzania. Two estates are certified both Organic and Fairtrade and the other three
are certified against only Fairtrade standards. All five estates have also been
included in the ETP program and two of the Fairtrade-only certified companies are
applying for RFA certification also. This trend of multiple certifications has also
been noted in coffee (Parrish, Luzadis, and Bentley 2005; Raynolds, Murray, and
Heller 2007).
This means that on the ground, concepts of sustainability are performed as the
interaction of these two frameworks rather than each being discretely defined.
While producers claimed that their motivation for engaging in Fairtrade was linked
to their “belief in the ethics of the fair trade system” (Interview October, 2009), both
of the Organic-certified companies claimed that they first joined the system because
they had “acquired overgrown fields” and the “costs for conventional rehabilitation
were much higher” than for Organic certification (Interviews November, 2009 and
February, 2010). Therefore in both cases, the main notion of sustainability was
articulated by producers as sustaining the business of tea production, which
includes what must be done to the ensure productivity of the tea plant itself and
sustaining access to marketing channels for the certified product.
The implementation of the Fairtrade certification system on the ground requires
a significant amount of investment by both the producers and the Fairtrade system
in the form of producer support and capacity building. The complexities of the
Fairtrade bureaucracy mean that much negotiation is required to navigate the
system. This is illustrated by the presence of full-time administrative employees

13

Some Fairtrade buyers (e.g., Cafedirect) will pay the $0.10/kg to the factory in addition to the

$0.50/kg premium to the SPO.
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who deal only with certification issues at two of the three certified companies in
Tanzania. A certifier explained it like this:
They have a lot of requirements. The compliance criteria is many. They
have to have a lot of policies. For example, child labor. Someone is not
engaging children into his work, but he does not have a policy. You see this
is a non-conformity. You see such a small thing. Or you have terminated a
worker, but you don't have records. So I need to see that, I need to check if
you have done it fairly to the worker who has been terminated. But I don't
see the record, so I raise it as a non-conformity (…) You can have a number
of non-conformities, but they are not major issues. (Interview February,
2010)
This bureaucracy was not noted in relation to the Organic standard. Instead an
Organic estate manager noted that the audit was rather simple, “all the inspector
has to do is see the weeds and he knows that we are Organic” (Interview January,
2010). In fact, there was little discussion about the Organic standard as a standalone technique as the discussions all inevitably returned to the FLO standard.
These pointed to the difficulties that producers had in dealing with the Fairtrade
bureaucracy and the enactment of the management systems for which Fairtrade has
been heralded. However, the Fairtrade and Organic auditor clarified the enactment
of sustainability in the cross-certified production systems for me. He explained:
The key benefits of all the certifications is they are forcing the world to go
organic. They would all prefer someone who is organic. They are saying: if
you are organic, then I don't check this. The move of the world now is to
have something that is organic. (Interview February, 2010)
Thus, the definition of sustainability laid out in the IFOAM norm that claims
that “organic agriculture develops a viable and sustainable agro-ecosystem”
performs a version of sustainability in that certified sustainable agriculture, as the
quotation above illustrates, is an enactment of ‘organic’ (IFOAM 2010). Therefore,
in these cross-certified performances we can claim that they are ‘effective’ because
while they may not be the same performance of sustainability laid out in the
standard, the standards are being used together to make changes (some foreseen,
many more unforeseen) in the practice of tea production. Thus, we do indeed see an
emergence of a twin-driven GVC (Islam 2008) or horizontal governance (Tallontire
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et al. 2009), where buyers, FLO, and Organic standards development organizations
are exhibiting asymmetrical power in GVC relations. Therefore, cross-certified
sustainability is also framed by international discourse on fair trade and organic
agriculture and is sustained by producers who can afford to become certified with
significant assistance of NGOs, national policy support, bilateral development
projects, and public-private partnerships.
CONCLUSIONS
As the above case studies show, one cohesive vision of sustainability is not
implemented in each of these four value chains. Rather, we see a contested
multiplicity of ‘sustainabilities’ whereby different actors are influencing how this
organizing concept is both discussed and enacted in a variety of ways. Moreover,
the way that the value chains themselves are organized suggests the ability of
external actors, such as the standards development organizations, to influence these
multiple performances. Therefore, an analysis of governance must also pay
attention to the social actors that influence decisions made about sustainable
production at the various stages of the value chain. These include processing
factories, smallholder associations, and the many nongovernmental organizations
that attempt to influence both public and private policies and behavior concerning
sustainable production (Guthman 2009). Some of these nongovernmental
organizations (e.g., Rainforest Alliance) both set standards for sustainable
agriculture, and assess and certify compliance with those standards. This shift is
congruent with the more general transformation that has occurred in the agrifood
system, that is, a decrease in regulation and an increase in voluntary forms of
governing value and supply chains.
The recent proliferation of buyer-driven and twin-driven GVCs points to a
redistribution of power along the GVC where the consumption end of the chain is
increasingly influencing the production end. Konefal et al. (2007) have claimed that
the future political arena of food and agriculture is likely to be the retailer-consumer
nexus. The case studies reported above support this conclusion. The use of
standards as socio-technical devices to perform multiple value chain ‘sustainabilities’
allows social movements to focus on consumption and production processes
simultaneously by supporting movements such as fair trade, organic,
environmental, and ethical trade (Barrientos and Dolan 2006). However, I also find
that the large-scale blenders in the tea industry, in collaboration with the social and
environmental labeling initiatives, are driving this move – rather than supermarkets
as happens with the GLOBALGAP standards. What may be emerging is a
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competition between supermarkets and blenders over the definition of
‘sustainability’ as each camp has staked out a claim in the Western European market
by being Fairtrade or Rainforest Alliance certified, respectively.
Dolan (2010) noted that the technologies of standards and conformity
assessment “increasingly render north south partnerships ever more virtual and
depoliticized” (p. 33). However, I would argue that the politics have not been
removed, but shifted from competition between buyers and sellers in the negotiation
of value within the market, to competition between certification systems as means
of ‘sustainable’ value addition; hence the emergence of politics in the consumption
arena. Also, local politics in Tanzania have been fueled by the introduction of
additional funds to the community in the form of the Fairtrade premium and other
standards-based training that is available from donor funds for certain ‘preferred’
suppliers. These upstream politics may also reflect the dominant role of companies,
such as Unilever, that have vertically integrated value chains and are therefore also
competing in the realm of production.
This paper exposes more questions about GVC governance than it can answer.
The categorizations of producer-driven, buyer-driven, and twin-driven shed some
light on which method of coordination and governance is benefitting which ‘lead’
actor. However, Gibbon and Ponte’s (2005) critique deserves more attention in the
literature, as even within buyer-driven and twin-driven GVCs, as shown in these
case studies, there are additional power negotiations that standards are keeping in
line. For example, Fold and Larsen (2008) claimed that the term buyer-driven is not
exactly accurate as there are many transactions at different points along GVCs
where buyers drive negotiations. Moreover, the question of who is driving the chain
is somewhat misleading in that even the weakest actors can influence its direction.
This is the case because the physical objects created/manipulated/modified by
actors in the value chain are not infinitely malleable. It is on this point where these
case studies attempt to show how performativity analysis can highlight the nuances
of value chain governance. Depending on the extent to which actors are involved
in articulating and interpreting their visions of sustainability, these changes will be
reflected in certain actors’ abilities to govern processes up, down, and across value
chains. These conclusions further confirm that rather than static vertical chains,
value chains are webs of interaction, where negotiations take place between actors
(and within institutions) at each node (cf. Gibbon and Ponte 2005; Rocheleau and
Roth 2007; Tallontire 2007).
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